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In general, misspecified models can cause harm through suggesting policies that
would in reality lead to destabilization of the economy as well as through limiting
policy options and thus preventing the policymaker from achieving the first-best out-
come. This paper specifically examines whether the choice of credit market frictions
in new-Keynesian DSGE models matters in the context of monetary policymaking.
We conduct a simulation exercise in which a financial crisis occurs and the monetary
policymaker shifts its policy to combat the crisis. In choosing the new policy, the
policymaker uses a credit channel model that suffers from a misspecification in the
type of credit market friction. We find that the policymaker would choose a policy
that not only destabilizes the economy but also performs considerably worse rela-
tive to an alternative policy that would have been chosen under a correctly specified
model. We further demonstrate that allowing the use of public financial intermedi-
ation as a policy option plays a key role in the above result. Finally, we show that
using a more flexible policy rule specification or reassigning stabilization objectives
can mitigate the problem of model misspecification with varying success.
Keywords: DSGE model, Financial Accelerator model, credit market friction




Since the global financial crisis of 2008, many economists have claimed that the environ-
ment in which monetary policy operates has drastically changed (Blanchard et al., 2010;
Caballero, 2010; Quadrini, 2012). In particular, it has become evident that the mone-
tary transmission mechanism through supply of credit (“credit channel”) matters greatly
in times of crisis, which has led central bankers to adopt credit channel models in their
routine policy analysis.1
Around the same time, we have also witnessed the surge of a new generation of credit
channel models, attempting to model the economy through a refined treatment of the
credit channel. One common feature of these models is that they explicitly model financial
institutions along with their detailed balance sheet structures.2 This is in sharp contrast
to the earlier generation of credit channel models, in which the role of financial institutions
is modeled as mostly passive or obscured.3
The recent shift in modeling strategy has been largely motivated by the following
observations during the financial crisis of 2008. First, the disruption in the interbank
loan market constrained the financial sector’s ability to borrow funds, which led to an
instant spike in many risk-spread measures. Second, the deterioration of asset prices,
combined with the deleveraging of the entire financial sector, left non-financial firms with
limited borrowing capacity. Finally, the monetary policymaker took various non-standard
measures during the period following the crisis in an effort to reduce the credit-related
problems and stabilize the economy. These observations point to the need to rethink how
credit market frictions should be modeled and what the role of government should be in
a standard credit channel model.
1In the pre-crisis era, it was customary to use arbitrary dynamic equations as proxies for “credit
constraints, house price effects, confidence and accelerator effects” (Harrison et al.,2005). For more
details on past practice in the central bank community, see Bayoumi et al. (2005), Coenen et al. (2007),
and Erceg et al. (2006).
2For example, see Adrian and Shin (2010), Christiano et al. (2010), Christiano and Ikeda (2014),
Cúrdia and Woodford (2010a, 2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), and Meh and Moran (2010).
3For the few exceptions seen during the pre-crisis era, see Chari et al.(1995), Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007).
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Given the numerous ways to specify the credit channel, it has become ever more
important to examine whether and to what extent it matters to correctly specify the
type of credit market friction in the context of monetary policymaking. To answer this
question, we utilize two credit channel models widely used in the literature. The first
model is Gertler and Karadi’s (2010, GK) credit channel model. The model assumes
that financial institutions do not have an effective commitment technology in honoring
the debt contract and hence become constrained through their own balance sheets. In
contrast, government is assumed to be free of such a constraint and thus is justified to
engage in financial intermediation as a means to combat the financial crisis. This idea of
government serving as an independent facilitator of financial intermediation has become
quite popular in analyzing monetary policy during the financial crisis and is incorporated
in many recent credit channel models.4 In our simulation we treat this model as the
“data-generating model” that represents the data-generating process in the real world.
The second model is Bernanke et al.’s (1999, BGG) credit channel model. This model
assumes that lenders do not know the productivity of individual borrowers and need to
pay agency costs in order to verify the financial state of the borrowers. In determining
which borrower should receive credit, the monetary policymaker is just as uninformed
as the private lenders, hence its policy tool is confined to the conventional interest rate
policy. The BGG model received broad attention from monetary policymakers before
and during the time of crisis. In January of 2008, the Federal Reserve governor Mishkin
stated in his speech that the financial accelerator mechanism in the BGG model describes
well the nature of macroeconomic risk that the monetary policymaker faces (Mishkin,
2008). Many central banks, such as the European Central Bank, the Bundesbank, and
the Riksbank, are said to have formally incorporated the BGG-style credit channel into
their DSGE models in the years following the crisis. Several empirical studies have shown
that the credit market friction in the BGG model is also empirically relevant,5 which has
helped this model to become one of the most widely used credit channel models within
4See for example, Cúrdia and Woodford (2010b), Del Negro et al.(2016).
5See for example, Christensen and Dib (2008) and Christiano et al. (2014).
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and outside the academic community. In our simulation, this model will serve as the
“approximating model”, which will be used by the hypothetical policymaker to estimate
model parameters and calculate the optimized policy rule parameters that minimize the
quadratic welfare loss measure. The above choices of using GK model as our “true” data-
generating model and BGG model as our “misspecified” approximating model is largely
motivated by the historical fact that at the onset of the financial crisis many central
bankers were not equipped with much of the credit channel models that were reflecting
the empirical facts learned through the crisis.
Using these settings, we conduct a battery of experiments. First, we check whether a
misspecification in the type of credit market friction leads to a quantitatively large shift
in the estimates of the model parameters. Second, we examine how the monetary policy
rule suggested by the misspecified BGG model (BGG-optimal policy rule) performs in
minimizing welfare loss during the financial crisis. Third, we compare how the BGG-
optimal policy rule performs against the monetary policy rule suggested by the correctly-
specified GK model (GK-optimal policy rule). Finally, we study whether the use of a
more flexible policy rule specification with additional credit channel variables or assigning
alternative stabilization objectives to the policymaker can mitigate the problem of model
misspecification.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that parameters esti-
mated using the BGG model remain relatively stable over different phases of the financial
crisis. Second, we show that using the misspecified model leads to a slight increase in
welfare loss. But when compared to the GK-optimal policy rule (which is unattainable
given the built-in misspecification), the BGG-optimal policy rule performs notably worse.
Third, further analysis reveals that public financial intermediation, which is ruled out in
the BGG model, plays a key role in achieving the first-best outcome. Lastly, adding a
lagged risk spread in the optimal policy rule is found to reduce the welfare loss, although
it still falls short of the case with the GK-optimal policy rule.
This paper makes three main contributions to the monetary DSGE literature: First,
the paper confirms that the BGG model is relatively immune to parameter invariance
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problems, even in the case of model misspecification considered in this paper. Parameter
invariance, at least in approximate terms, is important for any models to be used as
credible tools for policy analysis in the sense of Lucas (1976). It is particularly important
within the DSGE literature, because it is customary to interpret the change in model
parameters as structural change, rather than a consequence of model misspecification
(e.g., Canova, 2009; Smets and Wouters, 2005). Our result demonstrates that the BGG
model does a decent job in estimating model parameters, providing the policymaker with
a reasonably accurate description of the crisis.
Second, our paper is unique in that we examine whether an expanded monetary policy
rule with credit channel variables and assigning alternative stabilization objectives to the
policymaker, both of which are feasible in the misspecified model, can be used to reduce
the cost of credit channel misspecification. While several studies have independently
examined the benefit of these alternative policies,6 we are not aware of any study that
consider these policies as a means to correct the stabilization bias in a misspecified DSGE
model.
Finally, the type of misspecification considered in this paper has not been explored by
previous studies that also examine the consequences of model misspecification.7 Many of
the previous studies define their approximating model as a “simplified” representation of
the more complicated data-generating model, which necessarily generates very different
moments of endogenous variables. In our case, both the data-generating model and the
approximating model generate similar moments for inflation, output, and interest rates
through the financial accelerator effect. Therefore, observationally we cannot regard one
as a simplified version of the other, nor can we say clearly which one provides a more
“plausible” model dynamics in the sense of Faust (2012) by comparing the moments of
key endogenous variables. Our approach may be particularly useful for policymakers who
6See for example, Christiano et al. (2008), Cúrdia and Woodford (2010b, 2015), Driffill et al. (2006),
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011), and Yagihashi (2011).
7See for example, An and Schorfheide (2007), Canova (2009), Canova and Sala (2009), Chang et al.
(2013), Cogley et al. (2011), Cogley and Yagihashi (2010), Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez
(2007), Leeper and Sims (1994), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Lubik and Surico (2010), Rudebusch
(2005).
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wish to refine their baseline model by incorporating several off-the-shelf models but do
not know the clear benefit of choosing one over the other. We also note that while many
of the previous studies have used models with a relatively small number of equations as
their simulation platform, both of our models share a larger number of the structural
equations used in the model of Justiniano et al. (2010, JPT).8 Thus our results can be
seamlessly incorporated into monetary policy analysis, which typically utilizes more than
just a handful of observables and shocks in estimating model parameters.
The next section explains the simulation exercise and models. We present in the third
section the main results with regard to parameter changes and discuss policy implications.
The fourth section conducts additional experiments on how to improve model outcomes.




We use an extended version of Bernanke et al. (1999, BGG) as our baseline approximating
model in this paper. The extension of the model is done by incorporating additional
frictions (e.g., wage rigidity) and shocks (e.g., shock on marginal efficiency of investment)
into the original model, so that the model is similar to what is now used in the macro
literature as well as in actual policymaking. We describe the core part of the BGG model
below, leaving the details for Appendix A.
The BGG model motivates credit market friction through a combination of ex-ante
uncertainty regarding the individual borrower’s productivity and the agency cost (called
“bankruptcy cost” in BGG) required for the lender to verify the financial state of the
borrower. The latter is known in the literature as the costly state verification problem,
which is first introduced in Townsend (1979) and applied to many other credit channel
8This type of medium-scale DSGE models has been populated by empirical macroeconomic researchers
such as Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005).
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models.9 To overcome these hurdles between the lender (called “financial intermediary”
in BGG) and the borrower (called “entrepreneur” in BGG), the two parties agree to write
a loan contract such that the lending rate becomes contingent on the borrower’s balance










where Rkt+1 is the gross rate of return on capital that realizes in period t + 1, Rt is the
gross risk-free interest rate determined in period t, Qt and Kt are the price and quantity of
the borrower’s assets (i.e., installed physical capital), and Nt+1 is the net worth available
at the beginning of period t + 1. The positive credit market friction parameter ν is
derived from solving the optimal contract problem between the borrower and the lender,
taking into account both the size of the (unit) agency cost and the size of the individual
productivity shock. Equation (1) implies that as the borrower becomes more indebted, a
higher return on capital investment is needed to justify the loan contract. Any exogenous
shock that affects the leverage ratio will be accompanied by an additional “financial
accelerator effect” on the aggregate economy through the behavior of external financial
premium, EtR
k
t+1/Rt. This financial accelerator effect is further enhanced through the












where ACt−1 is the size of the bankruptcy cost incurred in period t − 1, Wb,t is the
borrower’s wage rate, Lb is the (fixed) labor supply, and γBGG is the survival rate of the
borrower. Equation (2) states that the borrower’s net worth is equal to the gross revenue
from the capital investment net of the borrowing cost.
9See for example, Arellano et al. (2012), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Fisher (1999), and Jermann
and Quadrini (2012).
10We follow Christiano et al.’s (2014) approach that regards the borrower in the BGG model as financial
institutions that invest in physical capital through their loans. To avoid confusion regarding the terms,
we will use lender/borrower hereafter.
7
2.1.2 Data-generating Model
We use the model of Gertler and Karadi (2011, GK) as our data-generating model. As
before, we focus on the core function of the model, leaving the details to Appendix A.
The GK model motivates the credit market friction differently from the BGG model.
It assumes that the borrower (called “banks” in GK) has the option not to honor the
debt contract and appropriate the funds. Because the lender (called “depositors” in GK)
is fully aware of such a risk, the borrower is confined to expand its assets up to a certain
leverage ratio.11
The threshold leverage ratio is determined by the condition that the benefit of con-






where ηt is the marginal value of the borrower’s net worth, vt is the marginal value of the
borrower’s assets, and λ is the fraction of assets that the borrower can possibly divert.
As parameter λ increases, or as variables ηt, vt fall, the borrower becomes more “balance
sheet constrained” (Gertler and Karadi, 2011). The constraint is assumed to be binding at
all times, and the strength of the constraint varies depending on the expected profitability
of the borrower’s business captured by variables ηt and vt. The net worth of the borrower
grows as follows
Nt+1 = γGK [(R
k
t −Rt−1)φt−1 +Rt−1]Nt + ωQtKt−1 (4)
where γGK is the survival rate of the borrower and ω is the proportional transfer from the
lenders to the entering borrowers to be used as start-up funds. Equation (4) shows that
the borrower’s net worth is the sum of the gross revenue from capital investments and the
11Here lenders are not limited to households, who are the ultimate savers, but may also include other
financial institutions that supply funds through the interbank loan market (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010).
For the same reason, borrowers are not limited to financial institutions that accept deposits from house-
holds, but may also include a broader range of financial institutions that issue short-term debt contracts
in the financial market.
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gross return on the previous period’s net worth. The revenue from capital investments is
increasing in both the risk spread and the leverage ratio.
2.1.3 Similarities and Differences between the Models
The BGG and GK credit channel models share several common features. First, both
models have common credit channel variables (risk spread and leverage ratio), which can
be used as observables when estimating model parameters.12 Second, the two models have
the same number of structural shocks. These are monetary policy shock, technology shock,
government spending shock, marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock, price markup
shock, wage markup shock, preference shock, and risk premium shock. In particular, the
MEI and risk premium shocks are considered to be especially important in examining the
consequences of credit channel misspecification, as researchers have pointed out that these
two shocks have played a prominent role in explaining the economic fluctuation during
the financial crisis (Christiano et al., 2014; Gali et al., 2012). Third, in both models the
main role of the risk spread is to amplify the effect of structural shocks, also known as
the financial accelerator effect. Finally, the implied slow development of net worth serves
as an internal propagation mechanism of the shocks.
The key differences of these models are as follows. First, the risk spread, which is at the
core of both models, responds differently to the endogenous variables. In the BGG model,
the risk spread (expressed in ratio of gross returns) responds contemporaneously to the
leverage ratio, and the credit market friction parameter ν determines the magnitude of the
response. In the GK model, the risk spread is indirectly associated with the leverage ratio
through the expected profitability of the borrower’s business. The credit market friction
parameter λ affects how strongly the current leverage ratio responds to the expected
future risk spread.
Second, in the BGG model the role of government in financial intermediation is limited.
If we maintain the seemingly natural assumption that the government is as uninformed
12They can also serve as additional variables that possibly enter the Taylor rule or stabilization objec-
tives. See Section 4 for more detail.
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about the individual borrower’s productivity as are the private lenders, then government
would set their contract lending rate such that the agency cost is eventually covered by
the borrower to avoid any loss. In such environment there is no strong justification for
the government to actively intervene in the business of financial intermediation, which
would result in crowding out the private lender.13 In the GK model, the government is
perceived to always honor its debt contract with the general public, which would free the
government from the type of balance sheet constraint that private financial institutions
must face at all times. Therefore, there is a potential efficiency gain for the government in
conducting public financial intermediation, especially during crisis when private lenders
face an unusually tight balance sheet constraint.
In sum, our model choice implies that the policymaker fully acknowledges the existence
of credit market frictions, but fails to understand the exact nature of them, which could
lead to misjudgment of the financial accelerator effect. In addition, the potential role of
the government differs in the context of financial market intervention, which may lead to
different economic stabilization outcomes in times of financial crisis.
2.2 Monetary Policy
2.2.1 Conventional Monetary Policy Rule (“Taylor Rule”)
The basic instrument of monetary policy in both models is the nominal interest rate,
which is allowed to respond to the endogenous variables in the economy. The monetary












exp (Smp,t) , (5)
where Πt is the gross inflation observed over time t−1 and t, Xt is the value-added output
observed at time t. φπ, φX , φ∆X are the monetary policy parameters that can be freely
13Note that it is possible to hypothesize a world in which the government is designated to offer credit to
lenders that is junior to private market debt, while using the taxpayer’s money to cover the bankruptcy
cost. In practice, such policy is rarely adopted because central banks, who is typically in charge of
implementing the policy, are highly averse of incurring any loss through engaging itself in the financial
intermediation.
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chosen by the policymaker, whereas ρR is the parameter that reflects the policymaker’s
preference for gradually adjusting the policy rate.14 Smp,t is the monetary policy shock
modeled as
Smp,t = (Smp,t−1)
ρmp exp (emp,t) , (6)
emp,t ∼ N(0, σ2mp).
The monetary policymaker chooses its policy parameters so as to minimize the follow-
ing quadratic welfare loss measure, subject to the linearized model equations
min
φπ ,φX ,φ∆X
L0 ≡ Γ′tWΓt, (7)
Γt = [Π̂t, X̂t, R̂t]
′
where the hat on top of variables refers to deviation from the steady state. W is a
3-by-3 diagonal weighting matrix with entries 1, λX , λR. The parameters represent the
importance of the output and interest rate stabilization components relative to inflation.
The method of approximating the expected utility of households through the weighted
average of the variances of selected variables has a long tradition in the macroeconomic
literature.15 This method has also been used by policymakers as a means to communicate
policy objectives to the general public (Evans, 2011). One outstanding characteristic
of the Equation (7) is that it includes interest rate smoothing as one of the objectives.
Woodford (2003) shows that including this component results in a better stabilization
outcome by making central bank behavior more predictable to the private sector. It is
also in line with one of the Fed’s statutory objectives for monetary policy, which is to
foster a “moderate long-term interest rate” (Federal Reserve Act of 1977).
14There is some ambiguity within the monetary policy literature as to whether to treat ρR as a prefer-
ence parameter or a policy parameter. We assume that the policymaker knows the value of ρR but does
not intentionally adjust its value. This is because in practice, central banks communicate their policy
intention through their target level of interest rate (= the terms in the large bracket) rather than through
the speed of adjustment towards the level it targets. Woodford (1999) demonstrates that when ρR is
freely chosen as a policy parameter, a “super-inertial” feedback rule (ρR > 1) becomes optimal, which
contradicts the general empirical finding that ρR stays within the unit interval.
15See for example, Benigno and Woodford (2004, 2005), Clarida et al. (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), and Woodford (2002). For a comprehensive survey, see Benigno and Woodford (2012).
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2.2.2 Non-standard Monetary Policy Rule (“Public Financial Intermedia-
tion”)
We further assume that when using the correctly-specified GK model, the policymaker
has an additional policy option to inject credit into the economy in response to the
change in financial intermediaries’ leverage ratio (“public financial intermediation”). This
resembles the large-scale asset purchase implemented by the Fed during the financial crisis,
in response to the deteriorating bank balance sheet. The fraction of publicly intermediated




where νg is the reaction coefficient chosen by the policymaker under the new policy regime
in addition to φπ, φX , and φ∆X when minimizing the Equation (7). Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) as well as Gertler and Karadi (2013) show that further modification of the model
allow us to analyze the effect of an equity injection, which was implemented during the
recent financial crisis.16 When there is no crisis, public financial intermediation is not
considered an option, i.e., νg = 0.







To simulate the recent financial crisis, we prepare three events (financial crisis, policy
shift, and end of financial crisis) and four time periods that are partitioned by these
events. Following the approach of Cogley and Yagihashi (2010), we assume that (i)
each period has the same length of sample period of T quarters, (ii) within each period,
there is an immediate convergence to a new equilibrium (i.e., no learning), and (iii) the
16Note that our non-standard monetary policy rule of Equation (5) does not involve policies that were
specifically aimed at solving the short-term liquidity problem (e.g., Commercial Paper Funding Facility)
that were implemented by the Federal Reserve around the same time.
17Blanchard et al. (2010) provides further discussion on why public financial intermediation is not
desirable in normal times.
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policymaker knows the exact date of the transition from one period to another, so that
model parameters in a given period can be estimated separately from another period.
Each period is characterized as follows:
1. The “Pre-crisis” period. Parameters related to the credit channel are set to the
benchmark values that reflect the relatively tranquil period before the crisis. Policy
parameters are initialized to the optimal values in the GK model (to be discussed
later).
2. The “Crisis” period. Average risk spread increases and average leverage ratio de-
creases, both of which are directly observable to the public. In both the GK and the
BGG models, these changes will translate into a larger credit market friction. In ad-
dition, the standard deviation of the risk premium shock increases. This increase is
not directly observable to the public and needs to be estimated for the change to be
acknowledged by the monetary policymaker. Policy parameters remain unchanged
from the pre-crisis period.
3. The “Policy shift” period. First, the policymaker recalculates the credit market
friction in the BGG model based on the observed changes in both the average
risk spread and the average leverage ratio. Next, the policymaker estimates model
parameters by matching the re-parameterized BGG model and the time series of
eight observables in the crisis period (defined in the next subsection). Finally, he
uses the newly estimated model parameters to calculate a new set of optimized
policy parameters in the monetary policy rule (5).
4. The “Post-crisis” period. Average risk spread, average leverage ratio, and stan-
dard deviation of the risk premium shock all return to the pre-crisis level. Policy
parameters remain unchanged from the policy shift period.
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2.4 Estimation
In preparing for the policy shift, the monetary policymaker obtains parameter estimates by
fitting the approximating BGG model to the observed data generated from the GK model.










where pi(Y|θi), i = GK,BGG represents the likelihood function, Y represents a vector
of variables and θi represents a (subset of a) vector of parameters that appear in both
models. The vector of parameters θi is further partitioned into private sector parameters
and policy-related parameters
θprivi = [h, ψ, χ, S
′′, ξp, ιp, ξw, ιw, ρmp, ρA, ρG, ρµ, ρp, ρw, ρb, rhorp, θp, θw]
′, (11)
θpoli = [φπ, φX , φ∆X , ρR]
′. (12)
The policy-related parameters (including ρR) are treated as being known to the policy-
maker and hence will be left out of the estimation. When the policymaker solves the
KLIC with respect to θprivBGG, the estimates converge in probability to the “pseudo-true”
estimates θ̂
priv
BGG. Due to the presence of model misspecification, there will necessarily
be asymptotic bias between θprivGK and θ̂
priv
BGG. In general, this bias can be “large” in the
economic sense, irrespective of the size of T . Only under the circumstance that the ap-
proximating model is correctly specified, this bias is expected to vanish as T approaches
infinity.
In our experiments, we make the following choices. First, we set our θGK according
to the posterior mean reported in JPT, which estimates the parameters using the sample
period of 1954Q3 to 2004Q4. Their estimates on key parameters are in line with previous
studies that use medium-scale DSGE models. Table 1 lists the actual parameter values
of θGK .
Second, we choose T = 8, 000 quarterly time series. To ensure that initial conditions
have worn off, we first simulate 8, 800 quarterly observations for eight variables (explained
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below), then discard the first 800. Our intent of setting T to an extremely large value is
to focus on the role of model misspecification and minimize the uncertainty that would
potentially arise from limited data availability. As we will see in the analysis section, T =
8, 000 is sufficient in making the standard error associated with the parameter estimates
tiny, such that the we can be certain that the estimates have converged to the targeted
pseudo-true values.
Third, when estimating the parameters θBGG, our policymaker utilizes prior infor-
mation on these parameters. Note that priors are introduced to facilitate the numerical
computation and to avoid the “dilemma of absurd parameter estimates” that are seen
in many pure maximum likelihood estimations (An and Schorfheide, 2007). In limit the
effect of the prior will be dominated by the large sample period and will have no effect on
the pseudo-true values (Gelman et al., 2000). We set the prior mean equal to θGK . Prior
standard deviations are set equal to the estimates in JPT, and these values are provided
in the last column of Table 1.
Finally, when estimating model parameters, the policymaker is assumed to observe
eight macro variables. The number of observables is intentionally matched with the
number of structural shocks in the approximating model to avoid indeterminacy. The
list of variables used as observables are inflation, output, interest rate, consumption,
investment, hours worked, wage rate, and risk spread. The first seven are fairly standard
choices in the monetary DSGE literature. We include risk spread because Christiano et
al. (2014) stress the importance of this variable being used as part of the observables in
order for credit channel models to achieve a good fit with the data. This choice would thus
give the BGG approximating model an advantage over the standard non-credit channel
models in estimating model parameters.
2.5 Calibration
Table 2 summarizes the parameter values that are not estimated using the approximating
model. Most parameter values are based on Justiniano et al. (2010), Gertler and Karadi
(2011), and Bernanke et al. (1999).
15
There are a few credit channel-related parameters that take different values in the
pre-crisis and crisis periods, depending upon how we define the financial crisis. In the
GK model, the fraction of assets that can be diverted (λ) and the proportion of assets
transferred to the entering bankers (ω) are chosen so that the targets for the average risk
spread and leverage ratio are implied. We assume that the average risk spread increases
from 100 basis points in the pre-crisis period to 150 basis points in the crisis period,
reflecting the observed spike in various measures of risk spread.18 We also assume that
the leverage ratio for the pre-crisis period is five and that for the crisis period it falls to
four. The level of leverage is close to the calibrated value in Gertler and Karadi (2010).
The magnitude of deleveraging is matched to that in Tressel (2010), which estimated that
the US leverage fell by 18% from 2007 to 2009.
Parameters used in the BGG approximating model are calibrated so that they target
the same moments in the GK model. For example, uncertainty about the borrowing firm’s
investment project (σb) and bankruptcy cost (µb) are chosen so that the same average risk
spread and leverage ratio as in the GK model are implied. These choices imply that the
elasticity of the risk spread with respect to the leverage ratio (ν) increases from 0.0126 to
0.0175, whereas the annual default rate increases from 3.42% to 5.64% from the pre-crisis
to the crisis period.19
For the risk premium shock, which was not estimated in JPT but appears in GK/BGG
model specifications, we assume that the persistence parameter ρrp remains constant
across periods, whereas the size parameter σrp increases from the pre-crisis period to the
crisis period in a regime-switching manner (Dordal-i-Carreras et al., 2016). The selected
values are within the range estimated by Gali et al. (2012) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
For the policy-related parameter, we set the relative weight of the welfare loss function
18In determining the credible magnitude of the upward spike, we considered risk spreads associated
with Baa corporate bond rates, short-term commercial paper rates (suggested by Gertler and Kiyotaki,
2010), and the LIBOR-OIS spread (suggested by Taylor and Williams, 2009).
19Note that the ν in our calibration is much smaller compared to other studies using the BGG model. In
most of these studies, the credit channel parameters are calibrated or estimated by treating non-financial
firms as borrowers. This leads to a lower target for the leverage ratio and a higher target for the risk
spread than what we considered in our paper.
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λX , λR following the values suggested in Woodford (2003). Policy parameters φπ, φX , φ∆X
are initialized to the values that minimize the welfare loss in the “true” GK model during
the pre-crisis period while ruling out public financial intermediation as a policy option
(i.e., restricting νg to be zero). This setting ensures that we start our experiment from
the optimal monetary policy rule, which would necessarily become sub-optimal once the
crisis occurs.20 Finally, the interest rate smoothing parameter ρR is set to 0.82 based on
JPT’s estimation.
2.6 Simulation Result
To double-check that our parameter choice for risk premium shock empirically makes
sense, we report a 10-quarter forecast error variance decomposition for several main vari-
ables in Appendix Table A.1. The results are reasonably close to what past studies that
utilize a medium-scale DSGE model have found.21
Appendix Table A.2 reports the change in volatility of the main variables (inflation,
output, interest rate) across different periods. We find that the change in the standard
deviation of the interest rate from pre-crisis to crisis period generated by the GK model
exceeds that of the BGG model, while the changes for inflation and output in the GK
model are slightly below those of the BGG model. However, the welfare loss as calculated
in the Equation (7) shows similar increases in both the GK and the BGG models (+12.0%,
+11.6%). This means that from the policymaker’s viewpoint, the consequence of the
crisis is similar in both models, and due to the similarity in outcome, it is difficult for the
policymaker to infer whether the BGG model is a good approximating model or not.
20An alternative approach is to initialize the policy parameters to the BGG-optimal policy rule in the
pre-crisis period. The policy parameters would be φπ = 3.86, φX = −0.47, φ∆X = 6.88, which are not
much different from the values that we adopt. Thus, for the sake of clarity in the later policy analysis,
we decide to use the GK-optimal policy rule with νg = 0 as our initial policy.
21For example, during the crisis period, the risk premium shock in our model explains 0.9% of the
variation in inflation, 2.6% of output, and 4.5% of the interest rate. Smets and Wouters (2007) report




3.1 Preliminaries: Parameter Invariance Problem
We first report the estimated model parameters in the BGG approximating model and
examine how they differ across periods as a consequence of model misspecification.
Table 3 presents the pseudo-true values for the four periods (pre-crisis, crisis, policy
shift, and post-crisis). Most of the standard errors are driven close to zero due to the large
sample period we adopted in simulation. When focusing on the preference and technology
parameters, we find that the BGG model does remarkably well in the crisis period, because
most parameters remain close to the “true” values used in generating the data. In the
policy shift period, the consumption habit parameter and the wage indexation parameter
appear as two of the few notable exceptions.22 This indicates that model misspecification
in the BGG model manifests itself mainly as an asymptotic bias caused by the policy
shift, rather than through the change in credit channel-related parameters.
Turning to the shock-related parameters, we see a somewhat larger influence of the
financial crisis on the estimated parameters. For example, parameters associated with the
MEI shock, the preference shock, and the risk premium shock notably deviate from the
value used in the data-generating model during the crisis period. Since the MEI shock is
often regarded as a proxy for financial market conditions, the observed change would be
correctly interpreted as a disturbance in the financial market by chance.23 However, for
other parameters the change is purely a by-product of model misspecification and hence
has no economic interpretations. Finally, the increase in the standard deviation of the risk
premium shock from the pre-crisis (0.29) to the crisis period (1.07) is only marginally off
from the values used in generating the data, which are set to 0.2 in the pre-crisis period
and 1 in the crisis period. Thus the BGG model provides the policymaker a reasonably
accurate description of the crisis.
22For the consumption habit parameter, the estimate is 0.90 as opposed to 0.78 in the data-generating
model, whereas for the wage indexation parameter the estimate is 0.19 as opposed to 0.11 in the data-
generating model.
23For discussions on the interpretation of the MEI shock, see Christiano et al. (2014), Hirose and
Kurozumi (2012), and Justiniano et al. (2011).
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The last column of Table 3 presents parameter estimates obtained during the post-
crisis period. Most of the estimates return to the pre-crisis level. The small differences
that remain in some cases reflect the different policies adopted during the pre- and post-
crisis periods. This demonstrates that the effect of the policy shift on parameter estimates
is minor in tranquil times.
One may wonder, at this point, whether a model without the credit channel can do an
equally good job. To examine this, we repeated the entire exercise by using the “original”
JPT model that does not feature an explicit credit channel as our approximating model.
In this new experiment, the risk premium shock and the risk spread variable are dropped
in the estimation process. The full estimation result is presented in Appendix Table A.3.
We find that the asymptotic bias becomes larger and many of the parameters fail to remain
invariant during the crisis period, as compared with the BGG model. Parameters related
to the MEI shock and the preference shock incur the largest asymptotic bias among all
parameters, likely absorbing the effect of the increased risk premium shock, which does
not exist in the JPT model.
We conclude that the BGG model performs decently in terms of estimating the struc-
tural parameters during the financial crisis. The result is somewhat surprising given that
both models generate different moments for individual variables during crisis. Our result
demonstrates the robustness of the BGG model in terms of the parameter invariance prob-
lem, making the BGG model a reasonable tool to evaluate the consequences of alternative
policies, in the sense of Lucas (1976). One possible downside of this finding, from the
policymaker’s perspective, could be that there is no chance to learn about the misspeci-
fication in the approximating model through the estimated parameters. In other words,
the policymaker does not have any motivation to improve upon its own approximating
model, which could potentially be costly in terms of stabilizing the economy.
3.2 Type 1 Cost: Stabilization of the Model Economy
In this and the following subsection, we examine whether the misspecification leads to
poor performance of the monetary policy in the context of stabilizing the economy. First,
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we check whether the optimal monetary policy rule suggested by the BGG model (“BGG-
optimal policy rule”) is helpful in stabilizing the economy in the (unknown) GK model
economy.
Table 4 shows how the standard deviation of selected variables and the associated
welfare loss change across all four periods. In the crisis period, we confirm that the welfare
loss rises to 1.5099, or by 12.0%, compared to its 1.3486 in the pre-crisis period. In the
policy shift period, the welfare loss further rises to 1.5335, or by 1.6%, compared to the
1.5099 in the crisis period. This means that the policymaker unintentionally destabilizes
the economy through its use of a misspecified model, but the magnitude of destabilization
caused by the policy is smaller than the destabilization caused by the crisis.
Table 4 further provides us additional information about the nature of the destabiliza-
tion. First, it shows that the overall rise in the welfare loss is driven by the increase in the
standard deviation of output (from 3.42 to 3.57), which dominates the marginal reduction
in the standard deviations of inflation and the interest rate. Second, in the post-crisis
period, the welfare loss falls to 1.3744, which is 1.9% higher than that of the pre-crisis
period (1.3486). This is because the standard deviation of output, which increased during
the crisis, has not returned to the pre-crisis level.
The further destabilization of the economy through adopting the BGG-optimal pol-
icy rule may have been caused by two factors: one is through the use of a model that
badly approximates reality, and the other is through the choice of model parameters that
are biased in relation to the “true” values. To better understand which of the two is
responsible for our outcome, we repeat the same exercise assuming that the policymaker
is informed about the true parameter values in all periods. Results are shown in the
Appendix Table A.4. We find that the welfare loss becomes even higher than the baseline
result, suggesting that the adverse outcome is due to the policymaker using a misspecified
model to design its policy, not because the model parameters fail to stay invariant.
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3.3 Type 2 Cost: Opportunity Cost of Using the Misspecified
Model
The next question is how the policymaker would have performed if he had been equipped
with the correctly specified model and how the BGG-optimal policy rule would fare against
the policy generated from a correctly-specified model.
Table 5 reports the policy parameters selected during the policy shift period and the
resulting welfare loss observed in the data-generating GK model for both the policy shift
and the post-crisis periods. We show that by using the GK model, the policymaker can
lower the welfare loss by 10.0% compared to the BGG-optimal policy rule (1.5335 to
1.3799, see Column (1)). This magnitude seems economically significant, because the
welfare loss comes down to a level only slightly higher than the pre-crisis period (i.e.,
1.3486). To achieve the same reduction in the level of loss under the GK model, the
policymaker would have to reduce the standard deviation of inflation by 14.1% (0.76 to
0.65), output by 14.4% (3.42 to 2.93), or interest rate by 23.1% (1.25 to 0.97) while keeping
other standard deviations fixed. This appears to be a difficult task, given that the only
policy option is the conventional interest rate rule in the BGG model.
There are two possible reasons for the BGG-optimal policy rule to perform worse
than the GK-optimal policy rule. One is because the policymaker uses a misspecified
model in choosing the optimal interest rate policy. The other is because public financial
intermediation cannot be used in the BGG model. To investigate this point, we examine
a case in which the policymaker is equipped with the correctly specified GK model, but
public financial intermediation is not feasible (νg = 0). Results are shown in column (2)
of Table 5. The welfare loss under the constrained GK-optimal policy rule with νg = 0
would be smaller than in the BGG-optimal policy rule (1.5053, as opposed to 1.5335),
but the magnitude of improvement remains much milder compared to the outcome under
the baseline GK-optimal policy rule (-1.8%, as opposed to -10.0%). This exercise shows
that public financial intermediation (or the lack of it) plays a key role in stabilizing the
economy during the crisis.
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The performance of different policies in the post-crisis period is shown in the last row
of Table 5. The welfare losses are found to be very similar across policies. For example,
the BGG-optimal policy rule performs only marginally worse than the constrained GK-
optimal policy rule (νg set to zero) and does slightly better than the baseline GK-optimal
policy rule (νg = −3.08). This result shows that the BGG-optimal policy rule performs
robustly once the economy returns to the pre-crisis state. It also shows that the optimal
intensity of public financial intermediation (νg) is sensitive to the credit channel-related
parameters.
4 Can Policymakers be “Nudged” Toward a Better
Policy?
So far we have maintained the assumption that the policymaker, who is equipped with
the BGG model, is confined to the conventional Taylor rule that minimizes the quadratic
welfare loss of the form suggested by Woodford (2003). In this section, we consider two
alternative policy options that are feasible under the BGG model and examine whether
they can be used to improve the outcome.
4.1 Expanding the List of Variables in the Monetary Policy Rule
The first experiment is to allow the policymaker to adjust the interest rate in response
to credit channel variables. The benefit of using a monetary policy rule with additional
credit channel-related variables has been studied extensively in the literature. There is also
narrative evidence that in the early stage of the financial crisis, the Fed had aggressively
lowered the federal funds rate by taking into account the deterioration of the financial















exp (Smp,t) , (13)
where CC is a credit channel-related variable, and νCC is the associated reaction coefficient
that the policymaker can freely choose. We consider two candidate variables (risk spread,
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leverage) with three timing options (contemporaneous, one period lagged, and one period
ahead).
Table 6 shows the welfare loss during the policy shift period using the expanded Taylor
rule in the Equation (13). All policy rules result in a lower welfare loss (between 1.4878
and 1.5130) compared to the baseline BGG-optimal policy rule with νCC = 0 (i.e., 1.5335).
Also, in four of the six cases the loss under the new policy rule becomes lower than the
loss observed in the crisis period (i.e., 1.5099). When we compare the magnitude of the
reduction across different credit channel variables, we find that specifications with the
risk spread lead to larger reductions in loss (between -2.1% and -3.0%) compared to the
cases with leverage ratio (between -1.4% and -1.6%). In addition, we find that the one
period lagged variables always perform better than other timings.
Our result is in line with many of the previous studies (e.g., Curdia and Woodford,
2015) that find that adding credit channel variables into the Taylor rule improves the
outcome when the true data-generating process involves a credit channel. The result
adds to the literature that such a modification is effective in overcoming the stabilization
bias caused by model misspecification.
4.2 Assigning Alternative Stabilization Objectives
The second possible solution is to assign alternative stabilization objectives that the pol-
icymaker should consider in the quadratic loss function. In the monetary policy liter-
ature, researchers have long discussed whether society is better off if the policymaker
were assigned an objective different from the social welfare function. A classic example is
provided by Rogoff (1985), who shows analytically that a “conservative” central banker
with a strong preference towards inflation stabilization beyond the socially desired level
may achieve a better outcome.24 Alternatively, researchers have argued that when the
model features additional structures and frictions, an additional component appearing in
24In Rogoff’s case, the adjustments in the preference are motivated by the unobservable shock process
that affects the time-consistent level of inflation and the trade-off between inflation and employment
stabilization objectives. Also see Canzoneri et al. (1997), Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), King (1997)
for related works.
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the quadratic loss function can be justified from a welfare-theoretic ground.25 In contrast,
our purpose here is to examine whether the same type of adjustment in the stabilization
objectives would be useful to prevent the destabilization of the economy that is caused
by model misspecification.
We now assume that the monetary policymaker chooses his policy parameters based
on an “expanded” quadratic welfare loss measure (7), where the vector Γ includes a fourth
variable in addition to inflation, output, and interest rate. For the candidate variable, we
consider ten endogenous variables (consumption, investment, capital, hours worked, wage
rate, risk spread, asset price, leverage, and rental rate of capital), which are all observable
in the BGG model. Figure 1 shows the realized welfare loss in the data-generating model
for four of the ten variables. Relative to the baseline case with the BGG-optimal policy
rule (i.e., 1.5335), the loss is reduced when consumption (1.5158), hours worked (1.5058),
wage rate (1.5241), and capital (1.5264) were individually added. However, in the single
case of hours worked, the resulting loss becomes lower than in the crisis period (i.e.,
1.5099). For the other six variables not included in the figure, assigning a positive weight
leads to a larger loss.
Figure 2 shows the welfare loss when two weights are simultaneously changed. In all
cases, the resulting loss is lower than the crisis period (1.5099), effectively avoiding further
destabilization of the economy through policy shift.26 The best outcome is achieved with
λL = 0.06 and λR = 0.266, with the resulting loss being 1.5054. But even in this case the
welfare loss remains notably higher than the loss under the GK-optimal policy rule that
allows for public financial intermediation (i.e., 1.3799).
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the consequences of model misspecification in the credit channel
model when a misspecification occurs in the type of credit market friction. In particular,
25See, for example, De Paoli (2009) and Erceg et al. (2000).
26We have also tried other combinations of variables, but none of them led to a notable reduction in
the loss measure.
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we choose the credit channel model of Gertler and Karadi (2010) to represent the unknown
reality and the model of Bernanke et al. (1999) as the approximating model with which
the monetary policymaker is equipped. Our main finding is that while the use of Bernanke
et al.’s (1999) model leads to a destabilization of the model economy, the change in the
welfare loss measure remains quantitatively minor relative to the opportunity cost of using
the misspecified model. We find that many of the gains of using the correctly-specified
model come from public financial intermediation, which indirectly supports the current
practice of explicitly modeling the balance sheet constraint. We further show that adding
credit channel variables in the Taylor rule or assigning alternative stabilization objectives
to the policymaker can mitigate the problem of using a misspecified model, a point which
has not been explored much in the relevant literature.
Our findings provide a new perspective to what the literature has long recognized as
the parameter invariance problem associated with DSGE models. We show in our paper
that despite the difference in how the credit market friction is modeled across the two
models, the estimated parameters themselves do not tell us much. While our paper shows
that the approximating model performs robustly in terms of model parameter estimation,
ironically it also makes it difficult for the policymaker to infer the “true” structure of the
economy.
One of the potential weaknesses of our experiment is that it does not consider the
zero lower bound (ZLB) problem, which could significantly increase the cost of model
misspecification because of the restrictions imposed on conventional interest rate policy.
Studies such as Williams (2009) report that the welfare cost of ZLB has been large during
the recent financial crisis. Del Negro et al. (2016) further demonstrate that when ZLB is
binding, a liquidity shock can have a large effect on the aggregate economy.
An interesting venue to explore in future studies is adding more structure to both the
data-generating and the approximating models so that a wider variety of policy options
can be considered. For example, by assuming that extending credit involves additional
resource cost, one can think of government subsidies that may potentially correct for
the undersupply of loans (Christiano and Ikeda, 2013). Another possible extension is
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the introduction of new financial shocks other than what we considered in this paper.
While the discussion regarding what type of financial shock best explains the recent
financial crisis is far from reaching consensus,27 it would surely be interesting to see
whether the presence of different shock(s) would make any difference in the context of
monetary policymaking.
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Appendix A: Full Model Description
We start with describing the part that is common to both credit channel models
(section A.1). The common part largely follows the specification in Justiniano et al.
(2010, JPT) and Gali et al. (2012). Details about the Bernanke et al. (1999, BGG)’s
model is shown in section A.2 and details of the Gertler and Karadi (2011, GK)’s model
is shown in section A.3.
A.1.1 Household












where Ct is consumption, Lt is labor supply, β is the quarterly discount factor. h is the
consumption habit parameter, ψ is the inverse Frisch elasticity, and ϕ is the utility weight
on leisure which pins down the steady-state labor in the model. bt is a preference shock
modeled as28
bt = (bt−1)
ρb exp (eb,t) ,
eb,t ∼ N(0, σ2b ).
The budget constraint for the household is
PtCt + PtIt + Tt +Dt = Rt−1Dt−1 + proft +Wt(k)Lt(k)
where Pt is price level, It is investment, Tt is lump-sum taxes, Dt is deposit, Rt is the
gross interest rate on deposits, proft is the profit from owing firms, Wt is the wage rate.
A.1.2 Goods producers
28Note that in actual estimation, we follow the suggestion by JPT and normalize the (linearized)





(bt − b). Similar normalization is applied to price
mark-up shock and wage mark-up shock (defined later).
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There are two types of goods producing firms. Final good producers aggregate the









where Yt(z) is the total production of intermediate goods of firm z ∈ [0, 1]. λp,t is the
price markup shock modeled as
1 + λp,t = (1 + λp)
1−ρp (1 + λp,t−1)
ρp exp (ep,t − θpep,t−1) ,
ep,t ∼ N(0, σ2p).
Intermediate goods producers hire labor and capital through the factor markets. These







t (z)− AtF ; 0
]
,
where α is the capital share of income and F is the fixed cost of production. At is the
technology shock that is modeled as
At = (At−1)
ρa exp (ea,t) , (14)
ea,t ∼ N(0, σ2a)

















where P̃t is the price chosen by the adjusters and πt is inflation. ξp is the Calvo price
parameter, ιp is the price indexation parameter. λp,t is the price markup shock modeled
as29
1 + λp,t = (1 + λp)
1−ρp (1 + λp,t−1)
ρp exp (ep,t − θpep,t−1) ,
ep,t ∼ N(0, σ2p).




(log(1 + λp,t)− log(1 + λp).
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where Λt is the marginal utility of nominal income for the representative household, and

















where MCt(z) is the marginal cost.
Supply for capital is determined through solving the optimal choice of investment by
the capital owner. The value of physical capital can be expressed as,
Φt = βEtΛt+1MPKnet,t + (1− δ)βEtΦt+1,
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. MPKnet,t is the marginal product of capital
net of capital utilization cost,
MPKnet,t = MPKtut − Pta(ut),
where a(ut) is the cost of capital utilization per unit of physical capital in real terms. ut
is the capital utilization rate, which determines the amount of effective capital available
for production in period t,
Kt = utKt−1.
Physical capital accumulates according to the following law of motions









where S represents the adjustment cost of capital that satisfies S = S ′ = 0 and S ′′ > 0 in
the steady state. µt is a marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock modeled as
µt = (µt−1)
ρµ exp (eµ,t) ,
eµ,t ∼ N(0, σ2µ).









where Qt = Φt/PtΛt is the Tobin’s q. Srp,t is the risk premium shock modeled as,
Srp,t = (Srp,t−1)
ρrp exp (erp,t) ,
erp,t ∼ N(0, σ2rp).
A.1.4 Labor market










where MCt(z) is the marginal cost.
Supply for labor is determined by the employment agency, who aggregates the house-









where λw,t is the wage markup shock modeled as,
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1 + λw,t = (1 + λw)
1−ρw (1 + λw,t−1)
ρw exp (ew,t − θwew,t−1) ,
ew,t ∼ N(0, σ2w).







)) (log(1 + λw,t)− log(1 + λw).
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where W̃t is the wage rate chosen by the adjusters and πt is inflation. ξw is the Calvo wage





















In both models, government spending is modeled as a fraction of the final goods







where gt is the government spending shock modeled as,
gt = (gt−1)
ρg exp (eg,t) ,
eg,t ∼ N(0, σ2g).
In the BGG model, government spending is financed as,
Gt +Dg,t = Tt +Rt−1Dg,t−1,
where Dg,t is the government deposit that yields the gross interest rate Rt and Tt is the
lump-sum taxes. In the GK model, government spending is financed as,
Gt + C
fi




where Cfit is the efficiency cost of public financial intermediation and QtKg,t−1 is the value
of public financial intermediation.













where Smp,t is the monetary policy shock modeled as
Smp,t = (Smp,t−1)
ρmp exp (emp,t) ,
emp,t ∼ N(0, σ2mp).
A.1.6 Goods market equilibrium
In the BGG model, the goods market equilibrium satisfies the following resource con-
straint,
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + C
b
t + a(ut),
where Cbt is the consumption of borrowers that exit the market. In the GK model, the
goods market equilibrium satisfies,
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + C
fi
t + a(ut).
In both models output (=GDP) is defined as,
Xt = Yt − a(ut).
A.2.1 Financial market in the BGG model
In the BGG model, the borrower m’s objective is to maximize the expected profit
in the next period that can be generated through capital investment. When financing
the investment, the borrower is allowed to obtain funds from the (representative) lender.
Thus the borrower m’s balance sheet at period t is expressed as
QtKt−1(m) = Nt(m) +Bt(m),
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whereQtKt−1(m) is the asset value at the beginning of period t andNt(m) is the beginning
of period net worth, and Bt(m) is the funds acquired from the lender. The objective
function for the borrower can be expressed as






where Rkt+1Qt+1Kt(m) is the overall profit from capital investment and Γ
b is the fraction
of profit that will be kept by the borrower after sharing the profit with the lender.
The lender is willing to provide the necessary funds as long as the net revenue from
lending covers the opportunity cost of investing the funds into a risk-free asset. The






where Γl is the fraction of profit kept by the lender.
The BGG model assumes that the individual borrower faces an idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shock ωb that makes the profit per unit of capital investment potentially differ
across borrowers. The shock follows the log-normal distribution with a mean of −0.5σ2b
and variance of σ2b such that E(ωb) = 1. In order for the representative lender to gain
access to the realized ωb he is forced to pay a bankruptcy cost µb that is proportional to
the asset value. To guarantee that the lender is guarded against the shock, the contract
pre-specifies a cutoff value for the productivity shock ωb such that if the realized shock
falls short of the cutoff value, the borrower is going to seize the residual claims net of
the bankruptcy cost. Solving the optimal contract problem and aggregating across all
borrowers leads to an expression that contemporaneously relates the nationwide leverage









where ν is the positive credit market friction parameter, which is determined through the
choice of µb, σb.
A.2.2 Net worth dynamics in the BGG model
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Aggregate net worth of the borrower is defined as the sum of the net worth for the












where Wb,t is the borrower’s wage rate, Lb is the (fixed) labor supply, and γBGG is the
survival rate of the borrower. ACt−1 is the size of bankruptcy cost incurred in period







Borrowers who fail to survive consume the following amount before exiting the market











A.3.1 Financial market in the GK model







where γGK is the survival rate of the borrower, β
jΥt,t+j is the stochastic discount factor
that applies to period t+ j earnings. Beginning of period net worth Nt+1 is defined as the





The above objective function can be rewritten in recursive form as



















As in the BGG model, the borrower is allowed to obtain funds from the (representative)
lender to finance its capital investment. The lender is willing to provide funds as long as
the terminal value of net worth at a given period is greater than or equal to the fund that
can be appropriated by the borrower,
Vt(m) ≥ λQtKt−1(m),
where λ is the fraction of asset that can be diverted by the borrower. When this incentive






A.3.2 Net worth dynamics in the GK model
Aggregate net worth of the borrower is defined as the sum of net worth for the surviving
borrowers and for the entering borrowers
Nt = Ne,t +Nn,t.
The net worth for the surviving borrowers is
Ne,t+1 = γGK [(R
k
t −Rt−1)φt−1 +Rt−1]Nt,
whereas the net worth for the entering borrowers is
Nn,t+1 = ωQtKt−1,
where ω is the proportional transfer from the lender to the entering borrowers. Thus the
overall net worth of the borrower grows as follows,
Nt+1 = γGK [(R
k
t −Rt−1)φt−1 +Rt−1]Nt + ωQtKt−1.
A.3.3 Monetary policy in the GK model
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In the GK model, the monetary policymaker can engage in public financial interme-
diation in addition to the conventional interest rate policy that is also available in the
BGG model. The total value of financial intermediation is defined as the sum of private
financial intermediation and the public financial intermediation
QtKt−1 = QtKp,t−1 +QtKg,t−1.









where νg represents the degree of intervention. When public financial intermediation is
implemented, an additional expenditure arises that captures the efficiency cost associated
with implementing the policy
Cfit = τψg,tQtKt−1,
where τ is the (unit) efficiency cost of public financial intermediation.
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Table A.1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
(1) Demand (2) Supply (3) Risk
shock shock prem.shock
Pre-crisis period
Inflation Π 24.7% 75.3% 0.1%
Output X 45.1% 54.7% 0.2%
Interest rate R 96.9% 2.7% 0.4%
Crisis period
Inflation Π 27.8% 71.4% 0.9%
Output X 48.9% 48.6% 2.6%
Interest rate R 93.1% 2.3% 4.5%
Note: demand shock is defined as the sum of monetary policy shock, government spending shock,
marginal efficiency of investment shock, and preference shock. Supply shock is defined as the sum of
price markup shock, wage markup shock, and technology shock.
Table A.2: Change in Volatility from Pre-Crisis to Crisis
(1) Pre-crisis (2) Crisis (3) Change
GK model
Inflation σΠ 0.73 0.76 +4.3%
Output σX 3.29 3.42 +3.9%
Interest rate σR 1.12 1.25 +11.6%
Welfare loss L0 1.3486 1.5099 +12.0%
BGG model
Inflation σΠ 0.79 0.83 +5.4%
Output σX 3.65 3.88 +6.3%
Interest rate σR 1.29 1.35 +5.0%
Welfare loss L0 1.6502 1.8414 +11.6%
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Table A.3: Pseudo-true Values, JPT Model
Subsample
(1) Pre- (2) Crisis (3) Policy- (4) Post-
Crisis Shift Crisis
Preference / technology parameters










































































































































Table A.3: Pseudo-true Values, JPT Model (continued)
Subsample
(1) Pre- (2) Crisis (3) Policy- (4) Post-
Crisis Shift Crisis
























































Table A.4: Standard Deviation under Correct Parameter Values
Subsample
(1) Pre- (2) Crisis (3) Policy- (4) Post-
Crisis Shift Crisis
Inflation σπ 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.70
Output σX 3.29 3.42 3.82 3.68
Interest rate σR 1.12 1.25 1.16 1.03
Welfare loss L0 1.3486 1.5099 1.5488 1.3842
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Table 1: Estimated Parameters
Parameter Distri- Standard
value bution deviation
Consumption habit h 0.78 Beta 0.04
Inverse Frisch elasticity ψ 3.79 Gamma 0.76
Elast.of capital utilization cost χ 5.30 Gamma 1.01
Investment adjustment cost S ′′ 2.85 Gamma 0.54
Calvo prices ξp 0.84 Beta 0.02
Price indexation ιp 0.24 Beta 0.08
Calvo wages ξw 0.70 Beta 0.05
Wage indexation ιw 0.11 Beta 0.03
Persistence of monetary policy shock ρmp 0.14 Beta 0.06
Persistence of technology shock ρA 0.99 Beta 0.01
Persistence of government spending shock ρG 0.99 Beta 0.01
Persistence of MEI shock ρµ 0.72 Beta 0.04
Persistence of price markup shock ρp 0.94 Beta 0.02
Persistence of wage markup shock ρw 0.97 Beta 0.01
Persistence of preference shock ρb 0.67 Beta 0.04
Persistence of risk premium shock ρrp 0.50 Beta 0.04
MA parameter of price markup shock θp 0.77 Beta 0.07
MA parameter of wage markup shock θw 0.91 Beta 0.02
Size of monetary policy shock 100σmp 0.22 Inv-Gamma inf
Size of technology shock 100σA 0.88 Inv-Gamma inf
Size of government spending shock 100σG 0.35 Inv-Gamma inf
Size of MEI shock 100σµ 6.03 Inv-Gamma inf
Size of price markup shock 100σp∗ 0.14 Inv-Gamma inf
Size of wage markup shock 100σw∗ 0.20 Inv-Gamma inf
Size of preference shock 100σb∗ 0.04 Inv-Gamma inf
Size of risk premium shock 100σrp
Pre-crisis 0.20 Inv-Gamma inf
Crisis 1.00 Inv-Gamma inf
Note: Parameter values in the second column are used in both the data-generating model and as the
prior mean used in estimating the parameters in the approximating model. All model parameters
are based on quarterly frequency.
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Table 2: Non-estimated Parameters
(a) Parameters Common to Both Models
Discount factor β 0.9904
Capital share α 0.17
SS Price Markup pss 0.23
SS Wage Markup wss 0.15
SS Work Hours (in log) logLss 0.38
Government spending share of output G/X 0.21
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
(b) GK Model Related Parameters
Fraction of asset that can be diverted λ
Pre-crisis 0.3503
Crisis 0.5130
Proportional transfer to the entering borrowers ω
Pre-crisis 0.0013
Crisis 0.0010
Survival probability of lender γGK 0.9724
SS government share of financial intermediation ψ 0.07
Efficiency cost of public financial intermediation τ 0.001
(c) BGG Model Related Parameters






Survival probability of lender γBGG 0.9724
Borrower spending share of output Ce/Y 0.01
(d) Policy Related Parameters
Taylor rule: Inflation φπ 4.06
Taylor rule: Output φX -0.52
Taylor rule: Output Growth φ∆X 10.45
Interest rate smoothing ρR 0.82
Relative weight: Output λX 0.048
Relative weight: Interest rate λR 0.236
Note: All parameters are in quarterly frequency.
46
Table 3: Pseudo-true Values
Subsample
(1) Pre- (2) Crisis (3) Policy- (4) Post-
Crisis Shift Crisis
Preference / technology parameters


















































































































































Table 3: Pseudo-true Values (continued)
Subsample
(1) Pre- (2) Crisis (3) Policy- (4) Post-
Crisis Shift Crisis
Shock-related parameters (continued)

































































Table 4: Welfare Loss Across Periods
Subsample
(1) Pre- (2) Crisis (3) Policy- (4) Post-
Crisis Shift Crisis
Taylor rule: Inflation φπ 4.06 4.06 5.36 5.36
Taylor rule: Output φX -0.52 -0.52 -0.79 -0.79
Taylor rule: Output growth φ∆X 10.45 10.45 10.03 10.03
Inflation σπ 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.72
Output σX 3.29 3.42 3.57 3.44
Interest rate σR 1.12 1.25 1.24 1.11
Welfare loss L0 1.3486 1.5099 1.5335 1.3744
(relative to previous period) (n.a.) (+12.0%) (+1.6%) (-10.4%)
Table 5: Optimal Policy Comparison: GK/BGG
(1) GK-opt, (2) GK-opt, (3) BGG-opt.
baseline νg = 0 baseline
Taylor rule: Inflation φπ 6.57 4.66 5.36
Taylor rule: Output φX -0.93 -0.58 -0.79
Taylor rule: Output growth φ∆X 17.10 11.28 10.03
Public financial intermediation νg -3.08 n.a. n.a.
Welfare loss L0, policy shift period 1.3799 1.5053 1.5335
(relative to BGG-optimal) (-10.0%) (-1.8%) (0.0%)
Welfare loss L0, post-crisis period 1.3817 1.3486 1.3744
(relative to BGG-optimal) (+0.5%) (-1.9%) (0.0%)
Table 6: Expanded Taylor Rule
(1) Add leverage (2) Add spread
(CC = φ) (CC = spr)
Taylor rule: νCC , contemp. rule 0.552 0.010
Taylor rule: νCC , backward rule 0.532 0.011
Taylor rule: νCC , forward rule 0.562 0.010
Welfare loss L0, contemp. rule 1.5117 1.4947
(rel. to baseline BGG-optimal) (-1.5%) (-2.6%)
Welfare loss L0, backward rule 1.5089 1.4878
(rel. to baseline BGG-optimal) (-1.6%) (-3.0%)
Welfare loss L0, forward rule 1.5130 1.5024
(rel. to baseline BGG-optimal) (-1.4%) (-2.1%)
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Figure 1: Welfare Loss when a Single Weight is Changed















































































Note: The horizontal axis in each panel represents the weights applied for the additional target variable
incorporated in the expanded quadratic loss function, which was set to zero in the baseline.
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Note: The horizontal axis in each panel represents the weights applied for the additional target variable
incorporated in the expanded quadratic loss function, which was set to zero in the baseline. The vertical
axis represents the weight applied for the interest rate smoothing objective which was set to 0.236 in the
baseline.
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